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Resource Adequacy: Should Regulators
Worry?
Hernan D. Bejarano, Lance Clifner, Carl Johnston, Stephen Rassenti, and Vernon
L. Smith
Abstract
Regulators have proposed various institutional alternatives to secure network resource
adequacy and reasonably priced electric power for consumers. These alternatives prompt many
difficult questions: Does the development of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity?
How effectively can a government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment? How
does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system in which
Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees? If exclusive distribution
contracts were replaced by unregulated retail competition, what would be the effects on investment
and market prices? We use laboratory experiments to address these questions.
KEYWORDS: electric power networks, resource adequacy, capacity markets, demand response,
retail competition, central commitment
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1. Introduction 
The California electric power crisis ended a decade ago, yet the industry 
continues to deal with the fall out. The causes of the crisis are reasonably well 
understood. California began to restructure its power market in 1996, and put into 
place a spot market for energy in 1998 but continued to regulate retail prices. A 
heat-wave in the summer of 2000 caused power blackouts, a significant rise in 
spot energy prices and complaints of market manipulation from state utilities.1 
Blackouts continued into the winter of 2001. Gov. Gray Davis declared a state of 
emergency on Jan. 17, 2001. By April, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. filed for 
bankruptcy because it cost much more for the company to buy energy on the spot 
market than it could earn back from customers who bought at a regulated price. 
 Factors driving up prices were high peak demand during the Summer of 
2000 and a combination of other factors during 2001, including a lack of available 
generation and transmission line capacity.  In February 2002, the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission began to investigate then defunct Enron Corp. for 
various trading strategies that contributed to the problem by overloading power 
lines and taking generator capacity out of production.   
 Since 2001, regional regulators and power groups proposed several 
instruments to correct California’s wayward reforms, among them: 1) Demand 
Response to create incentives to curb consumption when spot prices are high; 2) 
capacity markets to subsidize cost of building new generation capacity; 3) 
forward markets to give consumers access to long-term prices as an alternative to 
regulated price caps and gather intelligence about future market conditions; 4) 
revenue guarantees to give electricity investments added protection, and 5) open 
retail competition which would allow markets to self-adjust.  
 These alternatives prompt many difficult questions.  Does the development 
of Demand Response reduce the need for new capacity? How effectively can a 
government-mandated Capacity Market foster efficient investment?  How does 
centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees) compare to a system 
in which Generators voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantees?  
If exclusive distribution contracts were replaced by unregulated retail 
competition, what would be the effects on investment and market prices?  We 
used laboratory experiments to address these questions. For a review of previous 
laboratory electric power experiments, their incorporation into field trials, further 
modification and eventual impact on final applications see Rassenti et al (2002). 
  
                                                     
1 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. filed a complaint alleging manipulation of the markets in August 
2000. 
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2. The Experimental Environment 
We 2  developed a dynamic, interactive Internet–based platform that allows 
participants to function as profit motivated decision makers in the roles of 
distribution (buyers) and generation (sellers) companies in a real time competitive 
market. The market environment has the following capabilities: 
 Consumer demand cycling up and down during the various periods of each 
day. 
 Consumer demand growing in the long run. 
 Generating assets with carrying costs, startup costs, and nonlinear marginal 
fuel costs. 
 Generation companies able to build new generators. 
 A centrally coordinated Spot Market based on an Optimal Power Flow (OPF), 
which provides system wide power at the lowest total cost and calculates 
regional prices. An automated independent system operator (ISO) executes this 
market. 
 Distributors able to invest in Demand Response contracts with Consumers and 
build small local peaking generators.  
 Regulator Price Intervention in which the regulator evaluates average Spot 
Market Costs and adjusts the allowable resale price of the local Distributors.  
 A Forward Market in which all participants may engage in future period 
contracts for differences.  
 A Capacity Market in which suppliers may receive continuous payments for 
capacity in return for a promise to deliver that capacity into the Spot Market.  
 Self-versus Central-Commitment. Self-Commit is where the set of generators 
dispatched (who’s turned on or off) is governed strictly by the marginal 
generator offer prices submitted (using OPF), versus Central Commitment in 
which the system operator uses a reliability based central commitment 
algorithm to choose the set of dispatched generators, and guarantees all 
dispatched generators their minimum revenue requirement. 
 Retail Competition in which the Regulator allows the Distributors to charge 
whatever retail prices they choose, but frees all regions to retail competition. 
As implemented here, retailers in any region could compete in each other’s 
territory. The software can easily accommodate the entry of new firms into and 
or all the regional retail markets, but the experiments reported here do not 
implement any expansion in the number of incumbent retail firms.  
 This human decision market interaction system allows us to configure a wide 
variety of economic conditions and institutional rules (experimental 
                                                     
2  August Systems, Inc. and principals of the Economic Science Institute (ESI) at Chapman 
University. 
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treatments) by enabling or disabling the various capabilities in selected 
combinations. Depending on how well they manage their assets, participants 
acting as Distributors and Generators experience the viability and profitability 
of their strategic choices in a dynamic, competitive environment. This system 
was developed by August Systems Corporation in coordination with Vernon 
Smith and Stephen Rassenti of the Economic Science Institute at Chapman 
University. 
 
 All of the results from the scenarios presented in this report were run in 
environments where the underlying economic conditions and initial generation 
plant were identical.  Each experiment lasted 12 experiment “years”, with 10 
experiment “days” in each “year” and four experiment “periods” in each “day”.   
Demand cycled from low to medium to high back to medium in the four periods 
of each day to reflect the diurnal pattern of load, and there was an underlying 
trend of demand growth3 during the 120 days of each experiment during which 
time the Consumer demand would naturally grow by about 3.3% per year if retail 
prices were not changing.  Generating companies could independently set the 
Spot Market offers of each generator asset they owned in each region of a three 
region connected network, and could invest in building new generators at any 
location of the system. Regulated Distribution companies operating in a single 
region, could, when represented by active participants, actively invest in Demand 
Response that could then be sold into the Spot Market. Distributors could also 
construct some peak generation capacity as long as it did not exceed more than 
10% of their peak load in any Region in which they operated4.  
 The network model we used was simple.  It was meant to be an economics 
and investment model and not a precision electricity-flow network model.  As 
such, the network had three nodes (cities) where there was both load and 
generation.  While the generators were discrete units, all of the generators at a 
particular node were essentially treated as coming from the same point 
source.  Likewise, the load at each node was essentially treated as a point sink:  all 
load within a node was considered one point.  The only transmission limitations 
were imposed by the transmission lines connecting the nodes.  The transmission 
capacity of these lines was specifically chosen to be greater than the expected 
transmission flow to simplify the system for the subjects.  For subjects who were 
more knowledgeable about electrical networks, it would be easy enough to make 
the transmission lines a constraining feature of the system.  
                                                     
3 3.3% per year average compound growth rate, yields a total growth in demand of 48% from Day 
1, Year 1 to Day 10, Year 12.  See 'Demand and Investments in Capacity' below for more detail. 
4 Distributors were not allowed to invest in Demand Response or build peaking generators in 
Regions where they did not operate. 
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 A diagram of the network is shown below in Figure 1: Three Node 
Electrical Network  The three nodes are the boxes labeled R1, R2, R3, with 
connecting transmission lines, generating assets at each node denoted by Gn.m 
and Distributors at each node denoted by Dn.m, where n indicates the firm ID, 
and m indicates the asset ID. 
 
 
Figure 1: Three Node Electrical Network 
 
 A system regulator controlled Distributor retail prices through Regulator 
Price Intervention (RPI). Every three experiment days the regulator readjusted the 
regional retail prices in the direction of wholesale spot market price changes. RPI 
was not used in only two of the treatments:  the baseline simulation 0.1, where 
there were no active players (which was done for calibration), and in the ‘Retail’ 
experiments, where Distributors were allowed to set their own retail prices free of 
regulation.  The aggregate Consumer demand Drp in each region r for each of the 
480 periods p (four periods each day for all 120 days) of the experiment was 
preset in a demand file (see Figure 18: Schedule of Demand), and was exact given 
that the regulator (or retailers) would maintain the retail prices at the original 
reference retail price (PR = $70). However, when the allowable regional regulated 
retail price was changed to PS by the regulator, automated Consumers responded 
and the corresponding demand (Drp) (power consumed at the new price) changed 
to Drp·(PR/PS)
e to reflect the ratio between the newly set retail price and the preset 
reference price.  The constant elasticity of demand e was set to 0.2 (quite 
4
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inelastic), so changes in demand for small changes in price were insignificant and 
there was always demand for electricity even at very high prices. 
 The experimental environment was complicated (see example computer 
interface screenshots for a Generator and a Distributor in Figure 19: Screen Shot 
of Generator Computer Interface and Figure 20: Screen Shot of Distributor 
computer Interface). Subjects who participated in these experiments were trained 
twice for two hours each in the Dem environment (ID # 2 in Table 1) before they 
were used to generate data in the experiments reported below.  A significant 
number of the subjects were cross-trained on both the role of the Generator and 
Distributor, so that they were familiar with how both sides of the system worked.  
In addition, the subjects were provided with continuous access to a training mode 
version of the system over the Internet, so that they could use the system and be 
able to play the roles of Distributor and Generators at the same time and learn 
how the system works.  A number of subjects were able to manipulate the system 
to their advantage based on their experiences, including finding a few software 
bugs in the system that they exploited to their advantage.  The data from 
experiments where subjects exploited software bugs was not used in the analysis 
and the bugs were immediately rectified. 
 Computer coordinated auction market mechanisms in commodity flow 
networks can work to allocate resources with very high efficiency when demand 
and supply schedules are stable. A much more complex decision making 
environment occurs when demand is growing and there are lumpy investment 
possibilities. Though an efficient spot market can provide price signals for 
appropriate investment, coordination issues can arise and a market mechanism 
cannot provide appropriate incentives to undertake socially beneficial expansion 
of a network. Specifically, rising spot prices in our electric power network might 
signal of the need for future generating capacity, but this is a noisy signal, given 
that in order to obtain profits investments in new plants must be coordinated. In 
our experiment we provide subjects with a chance to announce a new generator 
that will come online sometime in the future, begin planning and building, and 
then withdraw from the commitment (up to a certain point) at a significant cost. 
Note, that if a subject drops an announced future plant before it ever comes online 
then he is signaling that he is willing to bear a cost to maintain his current market 
position. This option should help to coordinate investment plans at a cost, yet we 
still observe coordination failures in which subjects have trouble recovering their 
investment costs given simultaneous competitive investment in new capacity. 
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 The following set of 10 experimental treatments was conducted with 
subjects who were each at least twice previously experienced.  
 
Table 1:  List of Treatments 
ID  Treatment Participants # Experiments Treatment  Code 
0.1 Spot, No Investment, No 
RPI 
Robot Generators 1 simulation BotNoRPI 
0.2 Spot, No Investment Robot Generators 1 simulation BotRPI 
1 Spot Generators Only 5 Base 
2 Spot,  
Demand Response 
Generators & 
Distributors 
7 Dem 
3 Spot,  
Demand Response 
Forward 
Generators & 
Distributors 
5 DemFor 
4 
 
Spot,  
Demand Response 
Forward,  
Capacity 
Generators & 
Distributors 
5 DemForCap 
5 Spot, Central Commitment Generators Only 4 Cen 
6 Spot,  
Demand Response  
Central Commitment 
Generators & 
Distributors 
4 DemCen 
7 Spot, 
Capacity 
Generators Only 5 Cap 
8 Spot,  
Demand Response, Retail 
Generators & 
Distributors 
4 Ret 
Legend for Treatment Capabilities (for more detail on the treatment configurations, see 
Appendix I of the Supplementary Appendix5 on Treatment Descriptions). 
 
Spot – Spot Market enabled in the treatment (all treatments include the spot 
market). 
No Investment – Generator sand Distributors are not allowed to invest in any 
new generating capability. 
No RPI – The retail price of power to consumers is held constant, there are no 
retail price adjustments, allowing demand growth to follow the preset baseline 
growth pattern exactly.  All treatments with the exception of the two specifically 
marked as No RPI and Retail use Regulatory Price Intervention to adjust the 
retail price based on realized spot market prices. 
                                                     
5 http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/economic-science-
institute/files/WorkingPapers/Johnston_Rassenti_Smith_Bejarano_etal_SupplementaryAppendix.
pdf 
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Demand Response – Distributors are allowed to invest in Demand Response 
Contracts and Distributed Peaking Generators. 
Forward – Forward Markets enabled in this treatment, allowing Distributors and 
Generators to enter into financial contracts on the future price of electricity. 
Capacity – Capacity Markets enabled in this treatment, allowing Distributors and 
Generators to enter into financial contracts to supply capacity to the system in the 
future. 
Central Commitment – Generators are allowed to specify minimum payments 
for their generators to be committed and dispatched at any during the coming day. 
Retail –Distributors are allowed to adjust the retail prices they offer their 
consumers, and compete with other Distributors in all regions for those 
consumers.   
 Note that in addition to the treatments in which human subjects participated 
as Generators and Distributors, for comparative purposes, we are also reporting 
the results of two baseline simulations in which there were no active participants 
and robot bidders representing the generating companies always simply revealed 
the true marginal costs for each generator into the Spot Market. In both baseline 
treatments, the demand was generally upward growth with occasional points of 
negative growth or higher-than-normal growth, and the generating assets in the 
system remained fixed from the beginning to the end of the experiment horizon as 
the robots never built any new capacity. In treatment BotNoRPI, the regulated 
retail price remained constant (no RPI). In treatment BotRPI, the Regulator Price 
Intervention (RPI) adjusted the regulated retail price every three days, which 
caused changes in the actual Consumer demand.  
 
3. Demand and Investments in Capacity  
Resource adequacy can be defined as the ratio of net peak demand (aggregate 
peak period consumer demand at the current regulated retail price net of all 
demand response and distributor owned peak generation capacity), divided by the 
total capacity of all generator firms.  A ratio greater than 1.0 indicates a temporary 
capacity shortage, with spot price spiking to the system maximum of 1000. These 
capacity shortages occur with more or less frequency in the various experimental 
treatments we conducted, and sometimes at different frequencies within the same 
treatment if agents engage in different investment and pricing strategies. But 
resource adequacy is not the whole story for consumers: it comes with a cost. In 
our experiments the effectiveness of resource adequacy to make consumers better 
off is strongly correlated with the ability of Distributors to invest strategically in 
Demand Response and distributed peak generation. As an alternative to a 
Capacity market, Central commitment with the promise of revenue guarantees for 
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dispatch and reserve, can also attract investment in capacity, but then consumer 
welfare becomes even more highly correlated with the possibility of strategic 
Distributor activity.  
 In Figure 2 through Figure 11 below, total available capacity including DR, 
generating firm capacity, actual demand, retail price, and spot market price are 
plotted for the duration of a single typical run of each of the ten treatments. 
 The light blue line in each graph shows the total available generating 
capacity in the system.  Capacity for purposes of these graphs includes all 
generation capacity (including distributor owned peaking units) and DR contracts. 
  The red line in each graph shows only the total generating capacity 
under the control of the Generator firms.  
 The yellow line shows the actual realized total peak period demand served 
in the system.   The only exception is the BotNoRPI graph, where we explicitly 
graphed the underlying demand profile to show the increase in demand over time, 
including the embedded anomalies in demand where the demand was set to 
deviate from the long-term trend (see periods 22, 40-50 as examples). 
 The dark blue line shows the peak period spot market price.  The spot 
market price graphed is the peak period weighted average spot market price over 
all three nodes in the network. 
 The green line shows the retail price charged to consumers.  The retail price 
is the weighted average retail price over all three nodes in the network.  In all but 
the Ret treatment, the retail price is the same for all periods of the day, where the 
retail price is calculated as a function of the weighted average of all previous spot 
prices during the day.  See Appendix VII of the Supplementary Appendix on 
Regulator Prince Intervention (RPI)6 for the precise algorithm for calculating 
retail price. 
 The black line that only appears in the BotRPI case shows the underlying 
demand base that was used in all treatments. 
 As long as the capacity line is above the demand line, capacity is sufficient 
to satisfy peak demand.  When the demand line touches (or goes above) the 
capacity line, the system capacity is exceeded, resulting in the inability to meet 
current demand, and a shortage that was executed as a partial blackout.  Other 
than the BotNoRPI graph, the amount of the shortage is not shown in these 
graphs, as it is the served demand which is plotted. 
 Where the capacity line shows discontinuities and jumps upward represents 
new generating capacity coming on-line.  The larger the jump, the more capacity 
that came on-line during that period.  Generators may only be added to the 
                                                     
6 http://www.chapman.edu/research-and-institutions/economic-science-
institute/files/WorkingPapers/Johnston_Rassenti_Smith_Bejarano_etal_SupplementaryAppendix.
pdf 
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system, generators may not be physically withdrawn from the system, hence total 
capacity generally only moves upward. 
 The Total Capacity line includes both generating units (Generator and 
Distributor owned) and DR contracts.  The Distributors may increase or decrease 
their DR contracts at any time, so it is possible for the Total Capacity line to show 
a decrease, which reflects a decrease in total DR contracts that could have been 
caused by either the Distributors reducing their overall DR capacity and/or a 
decrease in available DR due to an increase in Retail Price. 
 A generator may be effectively removed from dispatch by the Generator 
owner setting offer prices for that generator at the system cap price.  This is why 
the spot price can sometimes hit the system cap price even though demand does 
not actually exceed the available capacity. 
 In the treatments with Demand Response (DR), the available capacity is 
much more fluid, shifting from day to day often with very small fluctuations.  
This reflects the Distributors adding and withdrawing DR from the system 
through the alteration of contracts and also fluctuations in available DR due to 
regulator retail price adjustments and/or natural growth of demand. 
 Demand would naturally increase at an average of 3.3% per year if the 
regulated retail price stayed constant at $70/MW.  However, Demand decreases 
when retail prices go up and increases when retail prices decrease according to the 
demand elasticity equation.  As can be seen in the underlying demand line in 
Figure 2, there are also several preset deviations from the general growth trend in 
the underlying demand (for example, at approximately period 20, and between 
periods 40 and 50). 
 Retail price is adjusted every three days by RPI, which is seen by the step-
like appearance of the retail price and demand lines on several of the graphs.  The 
BotNoRPI and Ret are the exceptions, since in BotNoRPI the retail price is never 
adjusted and in the Ret graph the Distributors are free to change their retail prices 
at any time during the experiment. 
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Figure 2: Peak Demand versus Capacity, BotNoRPI 
 
In BotNoRPI (robot generators, passive distributors and no regulator price 
intervention), the retail price for consumers was held constant, allowing demand 
to grow at the ‘natural’ rate reflected in the underlying demand data.  Supply 
remained constant throughout the duration of the experiment.  At the point where 
demand first exceeded the available supply, the Spot Market Price jumped to the 
maximum system price and remained there for the duration of the experiment.  
Since the consumers did not experience any price increase, they had no incentive 
to modify their consumption habits—despite nearly continuous blackouts in the 
high periods. This result, with distributors losing a fortune by buying at a high 
spot price and selling at a low fixed regulated price, dramatically illustrate the 
need for demand response contracts between distributors and their customers.  
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Figure 3: Peak Demand versus Capacity, BotRPI 
 
 In BotRPI, Figure 3, (robot generators, passive distributors and regulator price 
intervention), the retail price for consumers was adjusted every three days based 
on the current Spot Market Prices.  The retail price increase was generally enough 
to decrease demand back below the available supply, and thus cause the Spot 
Market prices to retreat.  By the end of the experiment, the underlying demand 
growth was great enough that the consumer retail price continued to escalate and 
the high period Spot Market price remained pegged at the maximum system price, 
$1000/MW. This result shows that even with the regulated retail price gradually 
adjusting over time there can be a long period of debilitating losses for 
distributors that can only be offset with demand response contracts.  
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Figure 4: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Base 
 In Base, Figure 4, (active generators,  passive distributors and regulator 
price intervention), the experienced Generators were able to manipulate the Spot 
Market price very early on, and also built new generating capacity.  The Spot 
Market prices caused the Retail Price to move upward and decrease demand.  As 
the new capacity came on-line, in conjunction with the slumping demand, the 
Generators were unable to maintain the elevated Spot Market prices.  Retail 
Prices then decreased, allowing demand to grow significantly through the middle 
portion of the experiment, until Spot Market prices once again began to rise, 
which in turn caused demand to drop. 
 
Figure 5: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Dem 
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 In Dem, Figure 5, (active generators, active distributors and regulator price 
intervention), the Distributors invested in adding Demand Response (DR) to the 
system.  At the point where the Generators were able to move the Spot Market 
price upward, the Distributors activated and adjusted their DR and forced the Spot 
Market price back down. 
 
  
Figure 6: Peak Demand versus Capacity, DemFor 
  
 In DemFor, Figure 6, (active generators, active distributors, regulator price 
intervention and a forward market), we used the most experienced participants. 
Gencos realized building early could be costly because Distributors could cheaply 
purchase enough DR and build distributed generation to keep peak prices 
suppressed for most of the experiment.7 In the final 30 days we observed the 
regulated price rising and a surge of investment in DR to control demand.  
Forward contracts for differences attracted little participation as distributors 
                                                     
7 At the end, distributors would have to greatly increase the price they are willing to pay for DR 
and can get caught unprepared when demand naturally increases past the critical point and puts the 
system into capacity shortage mode encouraging Gencos to cooperatively raise bids. 
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would have had to pay too large a premium and preferred controlling their peak 
period price risk through DR and building distributed generation. 
 
4. Capacity Markets 
Treatments designated “CAP” were designed to examine the effect of adding a 
biannual Capacity Market to the simple spot market when active Demand 
Response (DR) and distributed generation by Distributors is not a factor affecting 
prices, tends to provide capacity that remains very close to Consumer demand in 
the early going.  Initially, generating firms often managed to hold a ‘no-build’ 
coalition together, but later they tended to provide capacity in excess of demand.  
As demand increased, building began, spot prices decreased, and Generation 
firms rushed to collect capacity payments. This treatment showed that a Capacity 
Market by itself is not sufficient to keep installed capacity consistently above 
peak demand especially under status-quo conditions where there is little pressure 
from demand growth; whereas, the active participation of Distributors in the 
marketplace seems to play a key role in providing resource adequacy whether and 
when there is a Capacity Market. 
 
  
Figure 7: Peak Demand versus Capacity, DemForCap 
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representative experiment show an increase in investment in generation capacity 
and a corresponding suppression of spot and retail prices.  
 
Figure 8: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Cen 
 In Cen, Figure 8, (active generators, passive distributors, regulator price 
intervention, and central dispatch), the Generators requested high minimum 
payments to be dispatched into the system, in addition to targeting high Spot 
Market prices.  This strategy caused the Retail Prices to elevate precipitously and 
force demand down.  Eventually, the Generators were not able to maintain their 
high prices, and the Spot and Retail prices moved downward.  But the Retail price 
was still significantly higher than the other scenarios, and demand was also 
significantly suppressed relative to other scenarios. 
 
Figure 9: Peak Demand versus Capacity, DemCen 
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 In DemCen, Figure 9, (active generators, active distributors, regulator price 
intervention, and central dispatch), the Distributors once again invested in 
Demand Response and were able to use it to good effect to keep Retail Prices 
down and allow demand to grow.  Generators also built a several generators, 
which resulted in an over-supply of capacity, which also helped to keep Spot 
Market and Retail Prices lower. 
 
 
Figure 10: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Cap 
 
 In Cap, Figure 10, with this representative experiment, the Generators built 
additional capacity of varying amounts throughout the experiment but peak spot 
prices were high at the beginning, when Gencos did not build, and at the end 
when demand increases gave them an easier environment for collusive pricing. 
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Figure 11: Peak Demand versus Capacity, Ret 
 
 In Ret, Figure 11, (active generators, active distributors, and retail 
competition), the Generators quickly forced the Spot Market price to the 
maximum system price, and the Distributors reacted by immediately and 
aggressively raising their Retail prices, which caused demand to plummet.  The 
Generators were unable to maintain their pricing levels, but the Distributors did 
not lower their Retail prices proportionately.  A second price spike by the 
Generators was defeated by use of DR by the Distributors as well as by the 
Distributors belated making slightly less aggressive upward movements in their 
Retail prices over the remainder of the experiment. 
 
5. Surplus of Consumers, Distributors and Generators 
In the following figures, we compare the total surplus (net profits) gained by each 
category of market participant (Consumer, Distributor and Generator) in each of 
the eight treatments. 
 For Generators, surplus was calculated as their spot market revenues minus 
their plant capital costs and generating costs. In those treatments where there was 
a Capacity Market (Cap), Generator surplus was embellished by the capacity 
payments they received minus any penalties paid for not delivering capacity to the 
market. In those treatments where there was Central Commitment (Cen), 
Generator revenues are sometimes embellished by ‘make good’ payments from 
Distributors.  These ‘make good’ payments were pledged as a way to keep 
adequate generation capacity ready to serve.  
 
 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110
Periods
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
TotalCap GenCap ActualDemand BaseDemand RetailPrice SpotPrice
 
 R
et
 M
W
 
Pr
ic
e 
$ /
M
W
 
17
Bejarano et al.: Resource Adequacy: Should  Regulators Worry?
Published by De Gruyter, 2012
Brought to you by | George Mason University
Authenticated | 129.174.21.5
Download Date | 1/5/13 3:26 PM
 For Distributors, surplus was calculated as their retail market revenues 
from selling to Consumers plus any additional revenues received from the spot 
market by supplying demand response minus the cost of buying power in the spot 
market. In those treatments where there was a Capacity Market, Distributor 
surplus is diminished by its proportionate share (based on peak withdrawal) of the 
total cost of supplying capacity to the entire system but embellished by any 
capacity payments they receive for demand response minus any penalties paid for 
not delivering capacity to the market. In those treatments where there was Central 
Commitment (Cen), Distributor surplus was sometimes diminished by ‘make 
good’ payments which were required to keep adequate generation capacity ready 
to serve the market. 
 For both Generators and Distributors, whenever a forward (For) market 
exists their final surpluses may be embellished or diminished depending upon 
how their long run forward contract prices compare to the actual spot market 
price.  
 For Consumers, surplus was the value of the electrical power received 
minus the cost of purchasing it. Consumers and corporations use electrical power 
for many purposes, for example, watching TV or manufacturing steel. Each use 
created a different value for the customer depending on what the use was and 
when and where the use occurred. When all of the values for all of the customers 
in each of the experiments were added up, that represented the consumers' value 
for electricity. When all of the amounts that consumers spent to buy electricity 
were added up, that was the consumers' cost.  In this research, the area underneath 
the consumers’ demand curve up to the current retail price was integrated, and the 
retail cost of electricity times the power consumed was subtracted from that value, 
and yielded the consumer surplus (or Consumer “profit”). 
 In Figure 12, Figure 13, and Figure 14, box plots show the aggregate surplus 
of Consumers, Distributors, and Generators, respectively, realized over all periods 
of all experiments in each treatment. The black bar inside of each solid box 
represents the median surplus observed in each treatment. The left and right edges 
of each solid box respectively represent the 25th percentile (below which we 
observed 25% of the outcomes) and the 75th percentile (above which we observed 
25% of the outcomes). The ‘whiskers’ extend to the effective boundary of the 
observed distribution, beyond which we observed only 1% of the outcomes in 
either direction. Results presented in each figure are ordered from highest to 
lowest median values. 
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Figure 12: Consumer Surplus by Treatment 
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar 
 
 
Figure 13: Distributor Surplus by Treatment 
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar. 
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Figure 14: Generator Surplus by Treatment 
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar. 
 
6. Prices in the Retail and Spot Markets 
Figure 15 below contains a box plot of the retail prices charged by the regional 
Distributors to Consumers over all periods of all experiments in each particular 
treatment. In all cases (except for Ret) the regional prices were controlled by the 
regulator who under regulator price adjustment (RPI) allowed the Distributor a 
markup of 15% on all his costs: spot market energy costs, make good payments 
(under Cen), and capacity payments (under Cap). In the retail competition 
treatment (Ret), Distributors could charge any prices they wished but faced the 
potential competition from other retailers. 
 Figure 16 contains a box plot of the spot market prices charged by the 
Generators to Distributors over all periods of all experiments in each particular 
treatment. Spot market location-adjusted regional prices were calculated by 
ordering the offers of all Generators, and all Distributors willing to invoke 
demand response (Dem) when that was an option, and conducting an optimal 
power flow algorithm to satisfy demand at minimum cost.   
 In the case of the two treatments which involved Central Commitment (Cen 
and DemCen), Figures 8-9 interprets the spot price to include the average ‘make 
good’ payment per MW of capacity provided, as that is the effective spot price 
paid by the Distributor. Thus, if 1,000 MW were delivered at the spot price of 
$50/MW and total ‘make good’ payments of $20,000 were required for that 
period, then the effective spot price was considered to be $70/MW (= $50/MW + 
0 5.0 10
Generator Surplus (hundreds of millions)
DemCen
Dem
DemForCap
DemFor
Base
Ret
BotRPI
Cap
Cen
20
Review of Network Economics, Vol. 11 [2012], Iss. 4, Art. 3
Brought to you by | George Mason University
Authenticated | 129.174.21.5
Download Date | 1/5/13 3:26 PM
$20,000/1,000MW). Note that these ‘make good’ payments are why the Spot 
Market price reported in the Cen treatment in Figure 16 exceeds the system price 
cap. 
 
 
Figure 15: Retail Prices by Treatment 
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar. 
 
 
Figure 16: Spot Prices by Treatment 
Outcomes ordered by median, median shown by the black bar. 
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
In the California electricity 'crisis' in 2001, wholesale price volatility was extreme 
and, together with fixed (controlled) retail prices, created havoc -- rolling 
blackouts and (for the leading private utility) bankruptcy.  The public 
unappreciatively recalls the great inconvenience of uncertain and inadequate 
power supply. The experiments we report implement various sorts of institutional 
innovations that have been suggested to avoid power shortages and reduce 
marketplace volatility. But at what cost?  We examine the potential efficacy of 
some of those policies in results summarized below: 
 
8. Active Distributors 
Figure 12 indicates that the presence of active Distributors and Demand Response 
(Dem) significantly enhanced the surpluses of Consumers. Conversely, the 
absence of Demand Response created sizeable extra surplus for Generators and 
Distributors (Figure 13 and Figure 14) at the Consumers’ expense. Remarkably, 
Consumers’ benefits were uniformly greater in ALL treatments that featured 
active Distributors (Dem, DemFor, DemForCap, and DemCen), compared to 
the set of treatments where Distributors were passive price takers (Base, Cap, and 
Cen). The surplus results of the retail competition treatment (Ret) will be treated 
separately as the absence of price regulation creates a unique environment. 
 
9. Capacity Markets 
Figure 12 indicates that Capacity Markets (Cap) by themselves did not improve 
long-run Consumer welfare versus the Base with no active Demand Response. 
Capacity Markets lowered Consumer surplus slightly and raised retail prices 
(Figure 15) which includes the capacity charges the Distributors passed on to pay 
for the capacity guarantee. Capacity Markets alone did encourage the construction 
of more capacity than regulated Generators tended to build when left to their own 
devices (Appendix, Statistical Results, Table 7).   
 However, without the discipline from the demand side, Capacity Markets 
alone did not reduce spot market prices on average. And Capacity Markets, by 
themselves, did not encourage the building of as much capacity as any other 
alternative tested, especially when compared to the daily revenue guarantees of 
Central Commitment with ‘make good’ payments and active Distributors. In the 
alternative treatment which included a Capacity Market (Cap) along with active 
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Distributors (Dem) and a forward market (For), Consumers fared very well and 
plenty of capacity was built to accommodate growth. 
 The Capacity Market entails a periodic charge that is assessed across all 
Distributors in all periods.  This charge lifts the spot price up every period, which 
contributes an upward offset to the average spot price versus treatments without a 
Capacity Market and treatments with features other than just a Capacity Market. 
It is clear that in systems with Capacity Markets operating, Spot Market prices are 
not diminished by the presence of those Capacity Markets, as there is always peak 
capacity held outside the purview of capacity commitment that controls the 
critical peak prices, and compensation from the one sided hedge against spot 
prices above the Designated Limit Price (DLP) costs more than it's worth to the 
consumers. 
 
10. Central Commitment 
Central Commitment, by itself, depresses Consumer surplus while benefiting 
Distributors and Generators. Effective spot market prices increased as they 
included a biddable uplift received for just being ready for dispatch if spot 
revenue was not adequate to cover fixed and capital costs. Consumers ultimately 
pay for the ‘make good’ guarantees demanded by Generators, as Distributors pass 
on those charges through regulator price intervention (RPI). However, the 
revenue guarantees of Central Commitment make it an attractive investment 
environment stimulating more investment in capacity than in other treatments, 
including Capacity Markets. In the alternative treatment which included active 
Distributors (Dem) along with Central Commitment, Consumers fared much 
better and plenty of capacity was built to accommodate growth. 
 
11. Retail Competition  
Under retail competition (Ret), the exclusive service contracts of regional 
regulated Distributors were replaced with open retail competition and unregulated 
pricing to Consumers. These conditions produced a substantial increase in 
‘demand-adjusted’ retail prices, especially during peak periods (Figure 15). 
Demand fell sharply (Figure 11) as did Consumer surplus (Figure 12).  In other 
words resource adequacy never became an issue because retailers simply raised 
prices whenever power became scarce in the wholesale market.   
 As demand fell so did the need for investment in new generating capacity 
and this is reflected in measures of demand and investment in capacity as reported 
in Appendix Table 5 and Table 6. At the same time, measures of Distributor and 
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Generator surplus rose substantially. All of these can be seen as rational short-
term responses to incentives as electricity suppliers smooth out demand with 
higher prices at peak periods, thereby reducing the need for investment in 
Generators’ capacity. More study would be required to understand whether the 
reduction in Consumer surplus remains a long-term effect.  
 Recall that Ret was implemented to allow incumbent retailers to invade 
each other’s territory, but entry by new retail firms was not an option. An open 
question is whether this limitation is important in evaluating the effectiveness of 
retail competition.   
12. Concluding Observations: What Have We Learned? 
Concerns for resource adequacy in electric power networks have led regulators to 
propose various institutional alternatives to secure the adequate provision of 
electric power. There is a complex set of questions the regulator must address in 
assessing these alternatives. 
 How important is the development of Demand Response (DR) on the part of 
a Load Serving Entity (LSE, aka Distributor) in reducing the level and volatility 
of wholesale electricity prices, reducing the need for additional generator 
capacity, and maintaining a high level of Consumer benefits?  
 How effective is a government-mandated Capacity Market in fostering 
efficient investment in new capacity and maintaining a high level of Consumer 
benefits? 
 How does centralized generator commitment (with revenue guarantees for 
deployed generators) affect Consumer benefits as compared to a system in which 
Generators must voluntarily commit themselves with no revenue guarantee? 
 If the exclusive service contracts of regulated Distributors were replaced by 
open retail competition with unregulated pricing to Consumers, what would be the 
short and long run effects on investment, market prices, and Consumer benefits?  
 We developed an interactive software platform in which trained cash 
motivated human decision makers functioned as of Generating Companies and 
Distributors (LSEs) in a set of dynamic, multi-year power network market 
experiments to address these complex questions. The participants’ earned 
considerable cash profits during the experiments which depended upon their 
strategic bidding in Spot, Forward, and Capacity Markets, and their investment 
decisions regarding building new generation capacity and negotiating contracts 
with consumers for demand withdrawal. 
 The experiment’s statistical analyses substantiate a number of findings.  
First, the presence of active Distributors, with the ability to coordinate Distributed 
Generation (DG) and offer demand response (DR) through flexible contracts with 
Consumers, benefited Consumers by controlling wholesale spot prices and 
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regulated retail prices.  Additionally, Demand Response (DR) contracting reduced 
the need for investment in new generation capacity through reduction of peak 
demand.  Capacity Markets by themselves (with no DR) provided no benefit for 
Consumers who were required to pay for the surplus capacity, but created sizeable 
extra surplus for Generators and Distributors at Consumers’ expense. 
 Second, when Capacity Markets were combined with DR and DG, peak 
demand and capacity were more closely matched than in the scenarios where 
either market structure was in place in isolation.  Consumers’ Surplus also 
increased in the joint scenario over that achieved in either the Demand Response 
or the Capacity Market scenarios in isolation.  Central Commitment, by itself, 
depressed Consumer surplus while benefiting Distributors and Generators. 
However, Central Commitment did stimulate more investment in capacity when 
compared to some other treatments8, including having a Capacity Market.  This is 
due to the mandated ‘make good’ payments which provide revenue guarantees to 
the Generating firms as a way to keep adequate generation capacity ready to serve 
each period.  
 Third, when DR and DG, were added to the Central Commitment scenario it 
reduced retail prices, benefiting consumers; however, it also produced wholesale 
price spikes that coincided with demand growth later in the trading horizon.  
Retailers made Retail Markets work by raising retail prices to smooth out peaks in 
demand and reducing wholesale spot prices. This lessened the need for additional 
capacity but reduced overall Consumer surplus.  Market alternatives, including 
Capacity Markets (vs. none), and Central Commitment (vs. Self-Commit), 
improved Consumers’ surplus only when combined with ‘active’ Distributors.  
 The ultimate importance of ‘active’ Distributors’ ability to enter flexible 
contracting arrangements, which allows them to be responsive at critical times 
and to build critical peak distributed generation capacity, can be succinctly 
illustrated by the two data time series in Figure 17.  This graph plots peak period 
electricity prices for the duration of two different “12-year” experimental 
horizons. The dotted line at the top of the graph shows a typical series of retail 
prices where there is a Capacity Market but no ‘active’ Distributors (no DR or 
DG): retail prices were very high and Consumers do not fare very well. The solid 
line on the bottom shows a typical series of retail prices in a case where there 
were ‘active’ Distributors (DR +DG) and a forward market: retail prices were 
significantly lower and Consumers fared much better. 
 
  
                                                     
8 A ‘treatment’ is a precise set of parameters used to configure the software to model a specific 
scenario.  The complete list of treatments, or scenarios, is shown in Table 1. 
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Figure 17: Average Retail Prices in Selected Treatments. 
 
 Compared are two treatments: 1) Active Distributors with the ability to 
invest in Distributed Generation, Demand Response and Forward Markets (solid 
line), versus 2) Passive ‘price-taking’ Distributors with active Generators who 
may participate in a Capacity Market (dotted line). 
 The price ‘wave’ in the Capacity Market experiment graphed shows a 
typical example of retail prices decreasing after a lump of new capacity comes 
online.  However, retail prices increase again as demand continues to grow, 
without further investment in additional capacity. In contrast, the ‘active’ 
Distributors in the Forward Market above were able to keep the peak prices lower 
and very level. Indeed, the data show that whatever the configuration of market 
disciplining mechanisms are in place, those that are combined with ‘active’ 
distributors did the best job of keeping prices low and steady. 
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13. Appendix   
This appendix includes the experiment’s list of acronyms and a summary of its 
statistical results.  
 
14. Acronyms and Terminology 
Table 1 : List of Acronyms and Terminology 
 
  
Term Description 
BTM Behind the Meter.  Generation capability owned and operated by the consumer. 
DG Distributed Generation.  Small nodal peaking generators. 
DLP Designated Limit Price.  When a Capacity Contract is entered, the specified 
volume of supply must be offered into the system at or below the DLP. 
DR Demand Response.  DG and Contractual agreements between Distributors and 
Consumers whereby Distributors pay Consumers to temporarily reduce their 
demand (frequently with BTM generation). 
LSE Load Serving Entity (aka Seller or Distributor) 
Make 
Good 
Payments from Distributors to Generators, after a period which make up the 
difference between guaranteed revenues promised to the Generators by the ISO as 
a way to keep adequate generation capacity ready to serve and the actual revenues 
achieved in the Spot Market.  
OPF Optimal Power Flow.  The algorithm used to determine generator dispatch and 
spot market prices in the networked system model. 
Retail 
Price 
The price for electricity charged by Distributors to Consumers. 
RPI Regulator Price Intervention.  The Regulator (in this case, the server’s software) 
reviews the current retail price vs. the spot market prices over the last n days, and 
then modifies the retail price such that a certain profit can be achieved by the 
Distributors.  See Appendix VII of the Supplementary Appendix on Regulatory 
Price Intervention (RPI) for more details.  
Spot Price The price for electricity charged by Generators to Distributors. 
Surplus The profit realized by a group.  There are three surplus numbers used in this report.  
A simplified representation of the surplus calculations performed in this research 
is: 
Generator Surplus = (SpotPrice – Cost/MW)*MWsGenerated 
Distributor Surplus = (RetailPrice – SpotPrice)*MWsConsumed 
Consumer Surplus = (Value – RetailPrice)*MWsConsumed 
Treatment A specific configuration of parameters used in setting up a research scenario. 
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15. Statistical Results 
Following is a set of tables which summarize the statistical results of the data 
accumulated from the experiment. 
 
Table 2: Consumer Surplus Averages by Treatment 
 
 
Table 3: Distributor Surplus Averages by Treatment 
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Table 4: Generator Surplus Averages by Treatment 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  
Actual Demand by Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: 
Retail Prices, means and median 
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Table 7: Capacity Measures (Means) at End of Each Experiment by 
Treatment 
 
 
Table 8: Retail Prices by Treatment 
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Table 9: Spot Price Averages by Treatment 
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